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Directors’ Duties is a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the general duties of company 
directors found in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006). The second 
edition maintains the number and sequence of chapters of the first edition, but many sections 
are expanded to incorporate a more in-depth doctrinal analysis and the relevant new case law. 
Overall, the new edition builds on the strengths of the previous text in several ways. First, the 
book maintains a careful balance between, on the one hand, technical details concerning the 
content of directors’ duties and the consequences of their breach and, on the other hand, 
cross-cutting theoretical debates on the purpose of the business corporation and the role of the 
board of directors in corporate governance. This successful mix of doctrinal and practical 
insights makes the book equally appealing to academic and practicing lawyers. Second, the 
book maintains a comparative dimension and includes updates on relevant developments in 
other common law jurisdictions, notably Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Delaware law, 
however, does not feature as prominently as one would expect, with the notable exception of 
the section on the business judgment rule in Chapter 8. A more extensive comparative 
approach to Delaware and relevant federal US law would have been particularly interesting to 
academic scholars who call into question the homogeneity of the so-called Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance. 
 
The book is divided into seventeen chapters. The first three chapters focus on background 
matters: types of directors recognised at law and the role of directors as fiduciaries, from a 
theoretical corporate governance perspective. Chapters 4 to 13 analyse the duties comprised 
in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of CA 2006, with cross-references to other relevant legal provisions 
and duties. Chapters 14 to 17 are dedicated to procedural and substantive aspects regarding 
breach and enforcement of these duties.  
 
Certainly, the topic of directors’ duties cannot be treated comprehensively in a monograph of 
this size, and the author clearly underlines this in the introduction. The book does not purport 
to deal with all duties that directors have under UK law, or even with all duties imposed by 
CA 2006. The stated focus of this book is on the main duties set forth in Chapter 2 of the act. 
The remaining part of this review will focus on two chapters that go to the core of directors’ 
fiduciary duties: Chapter 6 on the duty to promote the success of the company and Chapter 9 
on conflicts of interest.  
 
The duty to promote the success of the company for the benefits of its members as a whole, 
set forth in s 172 of CA 2006, is addressed in Chapter 6.  This chapter is a remarkable 
analysis of one of the most controversial and challenging duties of CA 2006. The 
introductory part of the chapter, discussing the debates that led to the concept of enlightened 
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shareholder value, builds logically on the more fundamental corporate governance debate 
between the shareholder primacy principle and the stakeholder theory presented in Chapter 3. 
Keay’s discussion of the link between the common law duty to act bona fide in the interests 
of the company and the duty in s 172 is particularly insightful, as it brings to the fore the 
tension between the aim to achieve an enlightened shareholder primacy that captures the 
cultural change in the way in which companies conduct their business, and the judicial 
proclamations that this section codifies the pre-existing law on the subject.       
 
Another commendable part of this chapter is the analysis of the meaning of the duty to “have 
regard to” the interests of various stakeholders and the ensuing uncertainties relating to what 
constitutes a breach of such a duty and who can enforce it. Keay’s conclusion, with which the 
present author agrees, is that the duty to have regard to stakeholders’ interests does not 
impose on directors a requirement to balance the interests of shareholders and stakeholders, 
that is to ensure that all interests are equally promoted. While the actual weight that each 
relevant interest should carry in the decision-making process is a matter left to directors’ 
good faith exercise of discretion, an integrated understanding of s 172 as a whole leaves no 
doubt that the interests of present and future members rank ahead of the other relevant factors 
to be taken into account. The duty to take into account relevant considerations and to ignore 
irrelevant ones while exercising discretion is not restricted to company directors. It is a 
fundamental duty that governs the exercise of discretion by all fiduciaries.1 From this 
perspective, Keay’s analysis could have been enriched by insights from the trust law debates 
regarding the meaning of ‘relevant consideration’, the appropriate weight for relevant 
considerations, the ways in which this duty is breached or the consequences of breach.   
 
Another complex and controversial aspect of s 172 concerns the enforcement by stakeholders 
of the duty to have their interests taken into account. Keay argues convincingly that the main 
avenue for protecting stakeholder interests is via actions initiated by shareholders, such as 
board dialogue or derivative actions. This view is accurate from a company law perspective, 
but incomplete from a corporate governance angle. It fails to take into account the disclosure 
side of the concept of enlightened shareholder value. Indeed, Company Law Review’s vision 
of the enlightened shareholder value principle encapsulated in the codified duty of loyalty is 
built on two pillars. The first one is the duty to take into account stakeholders’ interests while 
promoting the success of the company (enshrined in s 172). The second one consists of 
meaningful disclosure duties concerning employees, suppliers, environmental, social and 
community matters (set forth in the now repealed s 417 on the business review). The 
philosophy behind the two facets of the codified duty of loyalty was that the new duty will 
acquire its force not through threat of litigation, but through an increased disclosure 
obligation and the ensuing market scrutiny.2 The legislators’ commitment to meaningful 
disclosure as a tool for enforcement is evidenced by the newly introduced duty to prepare a 
strategic report3 which imposes on directors of quoted companies a duty to disclose their 
policies on, among others, company’s employees and environmental, social, community and 
human rights matters. While such disclosure obligations are aimed primarily at company’s 
members, they are also widely studied by would-be investors and other stakeholders. 
 
The legal provisions regulating conflicts of interest form another key aspect of directors’ 
fiduciary duties. Keay’s extensive analysis of these provisions spreads across four chapters: 
                                                          
1 See Geraint Thomas, Thomas on Powers, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 555-558. 
2 John Lowry, “The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap through Efficient 
Disclosure” (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 607 at 618.  
3 Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Report) Regulations 2013/1970. 
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Chapters 9 to 12. Similar to the other chapters in this book, the discussion of the legal 
provisions as interpreted and applied by courts is very meticulous. From a doctrinal point of 
view, however, these chapters are a missed opportunity to engage critically with the 
justifications that courts and commentators have provided for the peculiar strictness of the 
rule against conflicts of interest. The author lists briefly the two main justifications of the no-
conflict rule, namely deterrence and evidentiary difficulties, but a critical evaluation of the 
soundness of these arguments is absent. Arguably, engaging with these debates is beyond the 
scope of this work. Nevertheless, identifying a solid theoretical foundation for the strictness 
of this rule is vital for its survival, especially in the light of recent judicial pronouncements 
arguing for its relaxation.4                      
 
Finally, a point on the consequences of breach of the duty not to accept benefits from third 
parties established by s 176 CA 2006. The nature of the remedy for breaching this duty by 
accepting secret commissions or bribes has been a highly controversial fiduciary law issue for 
the past century. The author summarises the personal versus proprietary remedies controversy 
in Section H of Chapter 15 and concludes, in the light of the applicable law at the time, that 
the personal claim view established Metropolitan Bank v Heiron5 and Lister & Co v Stubbs6 
is the valid approach. This is no longer accurate. In the very recent decision of FHR 
European Ventures LLP and others (Respondents) v Cedar Capital Partners LLC 
(Appellant)7 the UK Supreme Court ruled unanimously that these two decisions should be 
regarded as overruled. When an agent or another fiduciary acquires a benefit as a result of his 
fiduciary position or pursuant to an opportunity resulting from his position, that benefit is 
held on trust for the principal.   
 
The second edition of Directors’ Duties consolidates the position of this book as a reference 
text in this area of company law. It is hoped that the future editions will strengthen this 
book’s contribution to a coherent set of rules, principles and concepts governing the fiduciary 
duties of company directors. 
 
Dr Remus Valsan 
Edinburgh University 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [82], per Arden LJ. 
5 (1880) 5 Ex D 319. 
6 (1890) 45 Ch D 1. 
7 [2014] UKSC 45. 
